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Abstract 
 
BLACKOUT: Did Mainstream Media Censor SOPA Coverage? 
      Mary S. Tuma, M.A.  
             The University of Texas at Austin, 2012 
                                                Supervisor: Joseph Straubhaar 
 
 
 
It is imperative the public be made aware of major media policy decisions to help 
take part in and shape the industry that they rely on to be an informed citizenry in a 
democracy. However, in an increasingly concentrated media landscape where fewer 
owners control our channels of information and reign over a vast array of holdings, the 
system is firmly positioned to conceal or marginalize policy stories that negatively affect 
its business interests. This study explores mainstream TV news coverage of the 
controversial Stop Online Piracy Act or SOPA– legislation proposed to reduce 
counterfeit purchases online that came under fire from critics for potentially threatening 
the fabric of free expression on the Internet. By asking, “How much attention did major 
television news networks whose parent companies supported SOPA devote to the bill 
during their nightly broadcasts?” and “How much attention did major television news 
networks whose parent companies supported SOPA devote to the bill during their nightly 
broadcasts after the Internet Blackout protesting the Act?” it finds those networks whose 
parent companies sought to benefit from the Act’s passage failed to report on the 
legislation at crucial times before and after the SOPA debate. The results largely fall in 
line with the mainstream media– namely the broadcast industry’s– historical self-
censorship of significant media policy stories. 
 
 
vi 
 
Table of Contents 
 
 
Introduction…………………………………………………………………………………1 
 
 Background on SOPA………………………………………………………1 
 
 A Concentrated Landscape…………………………………………………5 
 
Chapter 1: When Media Cover Media Policy: A History of Censorship………………….11 
 
 Media Conglomeration, Media Policy and Conflict of Interest……………11 
   
 Theoretical Framework……………………………………………………..19 
 
Chapter 2: Blackout? : An examination of SOPA coverage by TV networks………………23  
 
 Methodology………………………………………………………………...23  
       
Results………………………………………………………………………26 
 
Conclusion……………………………………………………………………………………32 
 
References……………………………………………………………………………………34 
 
 
 
1 
 
Introduction  
 
 
Background on SOPA 
 
Introduced on Oct. 26, 2011 by Texas Republican Rep. Lamar Smith, the Stop 
Online Piracy Act (SOPA) aimed to curb online copyright theft, the sale of counterfeit 
goods online and to protect intellectual property by expanding powers of law 
enforcement officials. Critics of SOPA and its Senate counterpart, the PROTECT IP Act, 
argued the legislation would impede Web innovation and user-generated websites and 
threaten the future and foundation of the Internet. Critics spanned both sides of the 
political aisle with bipartisan lawmakers, including House Minority Leader Nancy Pelosi 
(D-California), Ron Paul (R-Texas) and Darrell Issa (D-California) vocalizing discontent. 
Most vehemently opposing the Act was the tech community, including Google, Twitter, 
Wikipedia, eBay and Facebook as well as historic Web and Internet service founders, 
human rights groups, academics and venture capitalists. Public interest organizations 
opposing the Act ranged in diversity from the ACLU to the Tea Party Patriots (Tuma 
2012).  
Aside from what they saw as the legislation’s inherent problems, some critics 
pointed to Smith’s cozy financial relationship with media– the industry most heavily 
championing the bill (McCullagh 2011, Masnick 2011). In 2006 the technology industry 
led Smith’s contributions, donating more than $95,000 to his campaign, according to the 
Center for Responsive Politics. Hollywood, leading the charge to push SOPA through, 
has replaced tech as Smith’s top contributor in the 2011-2012 cycle, according to the 
Center. Listed as “TV/Movies/Music,” the industry has generated more than $64,000 for 
his reelection effort. The Congressman is also listed as the top House recipient of 
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donations by commercial TV and radio stations and dubbed “Hollywood’s favorite 
Republican” (McCullagh 2012, Sanchez 2011, Tuma 2012).  
Pushback to the controversial legislation culminated on Jan. 18, 2012, when major 
Websites including Google, Reddit and Wikipedia staged a 24-hour “Blackout Day” in 
protest of SOPA– a symbolic attempt to highlight what they saw as a draconian attempt 
at Internet censorship. Echoing each other, both the Motion Picture Association of 
America (MPAA) and Smith characterized the online protest as a misinformation 
campaign and a “publicity stunt,” (Masnick 2012). The MPAA challenged the SOPA 
censorship protest as an “abuse of power,” writing at the time, “some technology 
business interests are resorting to stunts that punish their users or turn them into their 
corporate pawns.” Chastising the sites that participated in the event, the MPAA called the 
move an attempt to, “intentionally skew the facts to incite their users in order to further 
their corporate interests,” (Dodd 2012).  
Nevertheless, the event garnered significant attention from parties once dormant 
about the issue and from the individual citizen, who helped sway support from lawmakers 
through phone calls, emails and petitions. The tide of legislators supporting SOPA/PIPA 
shifted considerably after the coordinated censorship day. On Jan. 18, the Acts saw 80 
supporters and 31 opponents; the next day the legislation had 65 supporters and 101 
opponents (ProPublica 2012). The controversial bill was tabled two days later by House 
Judiciary Chairman Smith, “I have heard from the critics and I take seriously their 
concerns regarding proposed legislation to address the problem of online piracy,” said 
Smith in a statement. “It is clear that we need to revisit the approach on how best to 
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address the problem of foreign thieves that steal and sell American inventions and 
products,” (Smith 2012).  
On both sides of the aisle, SOPA defenders and advocates cast their opponents as 
working to protect their corporate interests and accused the other side of spinning the 
facts for monetary gain (Zapler 2011, Forsyth 2012, McCallagh 2011). On the industry 
level, the entertainment sector and Hollywood trade organizations led the charge to push 
SOPA through. Smith and the industries championing the bill shared similar arguments. 
Smith alleged tech giants like Google have a “vested interest” in opposing SOPA because 
they financially benefit from ushering users to rogue sites. "There are some companies 
like Google that make money by directing consumers to these illegal websites," Smith 
said in January 2012. "So I don't think they have any real credibility to complain even 
though they are the primary opponent." Smith argued counterfeit purchases online cost 
the U.S. economy some $100 billion a year– SOPA would curtail these billions of dollars 
lost and restore hundreds of thousands of American jobs jeopardized due to counterfeit 
goods and illegal online purchasing activity (Forsyth 2012, Tuma 2012).  
On the other hand, the Internet community, arguing SOPA would stifle 
innovation, censor free speech and dismantle the open and democratic nature of the 
Internet, pointed to Hollywood’s multi-billion-dollar corporate interests and historic 
lobbying power when it comes to issues like maintaining hold over their copyrights 
(Murphy 2011, Shanklin 2012) Former U.S. senator and MPAA President Chris Dodd, 
threatened to cut off campaign donations to Congress members who vote against 
legislation the MPAA supports, media reform advocacy organization Free Press– an 
aggressive opponent of SOPA noted in a January 2012 release. The group called for 
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legislators to return the industry group’s “dirty money,” and make clear that they won’t 
be “bullied” into supporting censorship (Free Press 2012).  
Additionally, the subtext associated with SOPA’s implications for the future of 
innovation and creativity online conjured a familiar struggle for those on the opposing 
side. The fight was seen by some as the latest battle in the ongoing  “Copyright Wars,” – 
a term that refers to the struggle between dominant media owners and content creators 
over intellectual property. Steeping the issue in legal and political context, Standford Law 
Professor Lawrence Lessig notably documented the long-waged historical battle over 
restrictions on copyright ownership in his book Free Culture. Lessig argues through a 
series of statues favoring the extension of copyright ownership by big media– namely 
Hollywood and the recording industry– that oftentimes ran counter to limits set forth 
within the Constitution, a movement developed to combat “copyright extremism,” 
(Lessig 2004, 2012). As is, copyright law is less about supporting creativity and more 
about protecting profitable industries against competition (Lessig 2004). Akin to Lessig’s 
description of copyright law, SOPA dissenters similarly characterized the legislation as 
burdensome toward creativity and broadly written with the purpose of threatening harsh 
penalties on property creators. Opponents also found SOPA to be draconian and 
redundant, as the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DCMA), which came under fire for 
being both Orwellian and too restrictive, is already in place to curb copyright theft online 
(Reuters 2011). Calling SOPA, “the most absurd campaign in the endless saga of 
America’s copyright wars,” Lessig recently marveled at the unprecedented defeat of 
Hollywood by Silicon Valley over copyright, saying, “For the first time ever, the Internet 
had taken on Hollywood extremists and won,” (Lessig 2012, 2011).  
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Corporate sponsors of the bill varied from conservative group Americans for Tax 
Reform, Major League Baseball and the MPAA to pharmaceutical corporation Pfizer. 
While these companies flexed their lobbying muscle to support SOPA, media 
conglomerates advocating for the Act had the potential to slant coverage of the 
controversial issue to their favor and were in a position to lobby via their vast network of 
press outlets. The question of whether or not this was the case will form the basis to 
which my study hopes to explore.  
The impetus for examination into possible bias rests on the fact major news 
networks ABC, CBS, Comcast/NBCUniversal (NBC, MSNBC), NewsCorp. (parent 
company of Fox News) were not only publicly listed as SOPA supporters but included 
their signatures in a September 2011 letter sent to Congress urging the government to 
pass the Act. Did these media corporations’ nightly newscasts reflect this support, 
examine the issue critically or simply ignore the topic? While the story gained noticeably 
considerable attention after the Jan. 18th coordinated “Blackout” did the mainstream 
media– equipped with a vested interest in its passage and who stood to gain from its 
success – do its part to cover the content and complexity of the bill before the height of 
its controversy?  
 
A Concentrated Landscape  
As prominent media critic Ben Bagdikian noted in The New Media Monopoly 
(2004), the number of media outlets we depend on for news and information has 
dwindled from 50 in the early 1980s to a mere five– now six– corporations today. As of 
2012, they are Comcast/NBCUniversal, Walt Disney, News Corp., Time Warner, Viacom 
and CBS. The conglomerates’ vast empire includes book, magazine and newspaper 
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publishing, film distribution and production, radio stations, TV networks, 
telecommunications systems, new media ventures and even stretches to the ownership of 
theme parks, professional sports teams and arenas. Together, these media behemoths 
earned an estimated $187.4 billion in 2011 (Comcast Corporation: $55.8 billion; Walt 
Disney Company: $40.1 billion; News Corp. $33.4 billion; Time Warner $29 billion; 
Viacom $14.9 billion; CBS $14.2 billion) (Free Press 2012).  
The concentration of ownership we experience today evolved as a result of 
specific communication policy decisions, the increasing influence of corporate finance 
and a consistently vague interpretation of the “public interest” as it relates to news owner 
responsibility over the course of American media history. Alongside the birth of radio 
and TV broadcasting came the unparalleled opportunity for widespread advertising and 
monetization of content. And to maintain these profitable interests broadcasters have 
been shown to systematically lobby and oftentimes develop revolving-door relationships 
with regulatory committees to ensure their stake in the market. But interestingly, the 
landscape– albeit for a brief moment in time– was not always purely commercial.  
In the mid-1920s, U.S. public broadcasting was largely held by non-profit 
organizations such as religious and civic groups as well as labor unions; commercial 
advertising was “almost nonexistent” prior to 1928 (McChesney 1993). In 1926, a mere 
4.3 percent of stations in America were “commercial” and only 25 percent of stations 
allowed the public to purchase airtime. Major corporations like General Mills were even 
denied the ability to advertise among 20 of the largest broadcasters of the time. The 
nascent National Broadcasting Company (NBC), for instance, framed itself as a non-
commercial entity, only existing to serve the public interest. The lack of profits became 
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problematic, yet direct advertising was not the primary solution proposed. The more 
mainstream ideas to counter the rising strain on revenue included government subsidies 
via an annual radio set fee (McChesney 1993). When radio licenses began to proliferate 
due to lack of regulation, Congress– with the support of then Secretary of Commerce 
Herbert Hoover– passed the Radio Act of 1927, creating the Federal Radio Commission, 
the precursor to today’s FCC. The agency was tasked with reallocating the airwaves and 
limiting broadcast licenses (Hilmes 2007).  Surrounding its passage, little discussion of 
the future of broadcasting and commercial involvement took place– rather the legislation 
provided a short-term fix to a current problem. Furthermore, the National Association of 
Broadcasters (NAB) and commercial outlets were “instrumental” in getting the Radio Act 
of 1927 passed, educators and nonprofits played little to no roll in the process, 
McChesney points out. Some of this came from a sense that anything was better than the 
“chaos” dominating the airwaves and that this was a way to actually–and perhaps 
ironically–prevent “monopoly over the air.”  
As time progressed the nonprofits and educators were effectively sidelined so big 
business could rule the game. The FRC’s first hearings gave voice to industry and 
accepted bottom-line oriented decision-making. They allocated frequencies to those 
stations affiliated with the larger networks, effectively marginalizing the nonprofits and 
college stations (Hilmes 2007). Choices were made with the assistance of radio engineers 
from the government or private commercial sector and sessions were mostly “closed and 
unpublicized,” (McChesney 1993). The FRC developed a cozy relationship with the 
major networks and NAB while a “near lack of contact with nonprofit broadcasters, 
public interest groups that might have an interest in broadcast policy, and members of 
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Congress,” existed (McChesney 1993). Moreover, the FRC’s interpretation of the “public 
interest,” – a term not defined until later– favored commercial development of the 
airwaves as it heavily relied on a market-based approach– through their listening power 
the public would dictate which stations would survive (Hilmes 2007). Because of this the 
number of commercial stations rose dramatically while non-profit outlets dwindled.  
It was not until The Communications Act of 1934 that the FCC was charged to 
uphold “public interest, convenience or necessity,” but even here, the public interest 
standard is not explicitly defined. Born from public utility legislation, many have 
criticized the terminology as vague, ambiguous and even, “a useless guidepost,” (Napoli 
2011). Some contend its ambiguity makes the FCC, “inherently more susceptible to 
congressional influence than other independent regulatory agencies,” – the numerous 
times the FCC has come under congressional review and investigation lends credence to 
this notion (Napoli 2011). In its interpretations of communication regulation, the 
Supreme Court is often noted for indicating the, “the public interest is what the FCC says 
it is,” suggesting the term is overly malleable.  
At its worst, the vagueness of the term can lead to a misrepresentation or even 
omission of the public in the process, as the connotations are inherently flexible. Leaving 
it too open for interpretation is said to be, “impractical, unrealistic and potentially highly 
detrimental,” (Napoli 2011). This ambiguity, Napoli argues, should be amended, and we 
should “work toward infusing the term with more specific meaning,” and enhance its 
utility. Unfortunately, the public itself has largely been characterized as “apathetic and 
uninformed” when it comes to matters of communications regulation, and thus the 
public’s opinion is said to not likely have substantial utility across the range of issues 
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before the FCC. Studies have shown the agency itself reflects and enforces this 
characterization as it, “largely ignores the input of the public in the information of its 
decisions,” (Napoli 2011). 
Today, the FCC largely continues to side with the dominant media players in the 
system, according to many media critics and scholars. But the scene was not always so 
unaccommodating to the public interest. From 1934-1980 the FCC sought to uphold the 
public interest by providing a range of quality content and the agency was seen as more 
sensitive to diversity of ownership, but the 80’s heralded a marked change (Bagdikian 
2004, Baker 2007). A tidal wave of intense mergers and consolidation, catalyzed by 
former President Ronald Reagan’s laissez-faire economic policy and lax anti-trust 
regulation reconstructed the media landscape (Holt 2001). The wave of Regan-era 
deregulation  (later exacerbated by the 1996 Telecommunications Act) shrunk the market 
and created a system prone to placing profit-margin over the pubic interest (McChesney 
1993). The landscape was additionally fueled by the economic philosophy of then FCC 
Chairman Mark Fowler, who argued against government regulation over broadcasting 
and instead placed faith in the mechanics of the marketplace to shape the media industry 
and satisfy the public interest (Fowler and Brenner, 1982). These policies, propelled by 
an anti-regulation FCC, gave way to vertically integrated oligopoly.  
Combined today, these major corporations possess more communications power 
than was exercised by any despot or dictatorship in history, contends Bagdikian, as the 
“corporate empires” control every avenue by which the population learns of its society 
(Bagdikian 2004). The corporations also work mutually to expand their already 
overreaching powers, sharing similar board of directors, similar investments and 
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oftentimes merging with one another. For instance, a 2005 analysis found that among the 
10 major media organizations, there are 118 people sitting on 288 various U.S. and 
international corporate board committees from Halliburton and Goldman Sachs to 
McDonalds.  
Additionally, several media directors formerly served in Congress and the FCC, 
suggesting a revolving-door relationship with corporate media and governmental policy 
makers. Potential conflict of interest issues in terms of news content appear inherent in 
these interlocking relationships, researchers concluded (Thornton et al. 2005).  
The “oligopoly” of dominant media firms have become “major players in altering 
the politics of the country,” not only by the news they disseminate (or for that matter, 
choose not to) but by advocating for laws and policy that eliminate regulation impeding 
their ability for more control– most notably The Telecommunications Act of 1996, 
Clinton-era legislation that further consolidated the media market (Bagdikian 2004). The 
Republican-backed Act relaxed ownership rules, elongated license renewal periods and 
further deregulated the broadcast industry after the Reagan era. It removed limits on the 
number of radio stations a single company could own, leading radio behemoth Clear 
Channel Communications Inc. to grow from 40 national stations to some 1,200 stations 
within five years. It also paved the way for television “duopolies”– a merging of two 
stations in one locale– now common place in the media landscape (Schwartzman, et al. 
150). Despite its significance and impact, mainstream coverage of the legislation was 
scant. The next section explores the manner in which media largely sidelined this and 
other policy decisions.  
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Chapter 1: When Media Cover Media Policy: A History of Censorship 
 
Media Conglomeration, Media Policy and Conflict of Interest 
An extensive 1997 study suggested the financial interest of parent companies in 
TV broadcasting affected coverage of the issue both by “action and omission.” While 
airing ads and editorials in favor of the $70 billion spectrum deal to broadcasters, TV 
news programs seem to have “blacked out” the policy topic despite ample indication that 
it satisfied the criteria of newsworthiness. Researchers note the pervasive tuning out of 
the airwaves battle among mainstream media. It reads, “Between mid-1994, when 
broadcasters got their desired “giveaway” clause inserted into the proposed 
telecommunications bill, and February 1, 1996, when the bill actually passed, as best we 
can tell, no national TV network covered the issue of the giveaway versus spectrum 
auctions,” (Page and Snider 1997).  
The study, which included interviews with congressmen, aides, policy experts and 
non-profit groups and analyzed U.S. newspapers, TV transcripts, internal documents 
from the National Association of Broadcasters sent to local TV stations, FCC and 
congressional testimony also made the case media organizations oftentimes serve as 
political actors, partaking a range of activities meant to influence policy.  
Described as an “abuse of power” in a 1997 newspaper editorial, the media’s 
ability to temper and control its own coverage of the legislation directly benefiting them 
came under criticism from some journalists, academics and scholars (Safire 1997). At the 
time, former FCC Chairman Reed Hundt noted the ironic dearth of coverage of an Act 
that many contend amounted to corporate welfare for big media, “It’s bad enough that 
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broadcasters are being given both digital and analog channels in perpetuity, without 
paying money or in-kind. Worse is that there have been no major televised discussions of 
the issues. The number one missing piece in the puzzle is, why wasn't this story about TV 
covered on TV?”  
Jeff Cohen, founder of media watchdog organization Fairness and Accuracy in 
Reporting, wrote the multi-million dollar “giveaway” to broadcasters was never 
mentioned on nightly news segments that typically focus on government abuse and Jeff 
Chester of the Center for Media Education pointed to the failure by evening newscasts to 
report on their companies’ lobbying efforts for the 1996 Telecommunications Act as a 
prime example of media self-censorship (Cohen 1997, Guensburg 1998). Columnists like 
William Safire (1996) and Molly Ivins (1996) tackled the censorship by broadcasters and 
the Columbia Journalism Review dedicated a long-form article pointing out the blackout 
(Page and Snider 1997). Former Senator Bob Dole even delivered a lecture on the Senate 
floor titled “Broadcast Blackout,” which chastised the free spectrum giveaway. During 
the speech, Dole pulled out a binder filled with print editorials on the deal in order to 
compare the broadcaster’s “strange silence” on the issue,  “You don’t see it on 
television.” Mums the word for Peter Jennings, Tom Brokaw and Dan Rather, said Dole. 
“Maybe they don’t know about it, maybe it’s not newsworthy but then why did the 
National Association of Broadcasters launch a multi-million dollar campaign to protect 
their interests?,” he wondered aloud (C-SPAN-2 Video Library 1996).  
Newspapers owned by broadcasters were also not immune from corporate 
influence. Papers that stood to benefit from the relaxation of TV ownership caps were 
shown to report double the favorable coverage of the Act, focusing on positive outcomes 
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rather than negative consequences. Newspapers with no stake in the issue reported on the 
issue with an “overwhelmingly unfavorable” frame with negative consequences reported 
on three times as much as positive consequences.  
Researches concluded the legislation’s effects were presented very differently 
based on if the newspaper’s corporate owners would gain from the Act, lending support 
to their initial claim that news bureaus strive to downplay significant issues about the 
increased concentration of American media ownership (Gilens and Hertzman 2000).   
Page and Snider likewise discovered in their expansive examination, all of the broadcast-
owned papers analyzed ran strictly pro-free spectrum editorials while all of the non-
stakeholding papers ran anti-spectrum giveaway op-eds (Page and Snider 1997). These 
findings are consistent with a 1986 study that found most newspaper editorials in leading 
publications favored deregulation of the broadcast industry and ownership affiliations 
affected these positions (Pratte and Whiting 1986). In the end, neither the pro-
deregulation editorials or the ones advocating against it properly informed the public, 
researchers concluded. In their words, most of the op-eds, “failed to reflect the 
complexity of the issue.”  
Broadcast networks were similarly absent from taking on arguably one of the 
most significant proposed rule changes to the broadcast industry in the past decade. In 
2002, former FCC Chairman Michael Powell led a crusade to relax media cross-
ownership regulations. Powell’s plan would increase consolidation by allowing one 
media outlet to own a monopoly cable provider, newspaper, three major TV broadcast 
stations and eight radio stations (Newman, Scott 2005). While public television followed 
the story critically for months, large broadcast stations failed to fully deliver critical 
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context to the issue:  
 
Most network newscasts dutifully covered the scandalous story as briefly and 
coolly as possible failing to disclose how much it meant to their parent companies, which 
were lobbying furiously for gobble-up rights (Safire 2003, 33).  
 
 
 
A February 2003 Pew Research Center for the People and the Press study 
highlighted the public’s lack of awareness, finding more than 70 percent of respondents 
had heard “nothing” about the historic FCC proposal; a mere three percent had heard “a 
lot” (Pew 2003). And even among those who said they heard “a little,” 57 percent 
opposed it, indicating when made aware the public understands consolidation hurts 
democracy (Baker 2007). 
Following the same pattern, the number one underreported story of 2006 was the 
future of the Internet debate centering around Net Neutrality, an issue that pitted large 
telecommunication providers against the public interest, according to Project Censored 
(2006). Despite the underground activist uproar, the issue didn’t make the headlines until 
late 2006. Aside from occasional coverage on CNBC’s Kudlow & Kramer, mainstream 
television “almost completely ignored” the critical topic during the legislative process 
and Supreme Court decisions (Philips 2006).  
The censorship-by-omission of legislation affecting media companies is not 
novel. A March 1979 bill proposed by Lionel Van Deerlin, a former journalist and 
Chairman of the House Subcommittee on Communications, sought to alter 
communications law for the first time in 45 years by granting commercial broadcasters 
what they had hoped for– the removal of requirements mandating equal access for 
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political candidates and stripping away any additional need to report community issues. 
While 200 people attended the press conference announcing the legislation, no television 
network in the nation covered the event (Bagdikian 2004). The censorship even stretches 
back to the genesis of radio policy. While commercial broadcasters sought to deregulate 
the burgeoning industry in the early 30s, the debate received negligible coverage and the 
reporting it did receive simply bolstered the status quo and sidelined the broadcast 
reformers (McChesney 1991).  
By and large the public remains unaware of how the media environment is 
structured by direct policy decisions crafted by powerful corporate lobbies. Instead, they 
are led to believe the communications landscape is formed by the “invisible hand” of the 
free-market, McChesney argues– and the media themselves lead and perpetuate this 
fallacy. The public’s vision is further obfuscated from this reality by a lapdog press that 
treats these crucial decisions as “business stories of importance to owners and managers, 
not as political stories of interest to citizens in a democracy,” (McChesney 2005). The 
track record of media covering media policy shows news outlets exert their control over 
the news to, “limit, distort or trivialize” public awareness of media policy debates and 
thus prevents citizen action to combat policies not conducive to the public interest 
(McChesney 2005). 
Previous research additionally suggests interlocking business associations with 
parent companies prevent some outlets from fairly reporting on important or 
controversial political, societal and fiscal issues. Historically, the mainstream media have 
a propensity to censor– including censorship by omission– topics that directly or 
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indirectly pose a conflict of interest to their partners, owners, subsidiary and/or affiliates 
(McChesney 2005, Chomsky 1988).  
For instance, during the 1996 Olympic Games, sports anchor Bob Costas drew 
attention to China’s various human rights violations and the drug abuse problems 
associated with its Olympic athletes (Bennett 2007). NBC corporate headquarters quickly 
vocalized their anger with Costas and issued a formal apology to China, “We wanted to 
make it clear that we didn't intend to hurt their feelings,” said Ed Markey, an NBC Sports 
vice president following the apology. While Costas comments were factual and heavily 
documented, some note NBC moved to rebuke the journalist because its parent company 
General Electric, “one of the largest foreign industrial enterprises in China,” had lucrative 
business deals including electrical infrastructure and medical equipment at stake in the 
country. NBC also had satellite channels in place that it hoped to greenlight with 
politically sensitive Chinese authorities. When asked if its parent company’s market 
interest influenced the apology, Markey said, “Not as far as I was concerned,” (New 
York Times 1996).  
Comparably, an ABC News investigation documenting negligent hiring practices 
and allegations of employing convicted pedophiles at Disney World theme park died at 
the hands of the network (Bennett 2007). Before the expose was scheduled to air on 
newsmagazine “20/20,” Disney Chairman and parent company owner of ABC, Michael 
Eisner, told National Public Radio during an interview, “I would prefer ABC not to cover 
Disney…I think it’s inappropriate for Disney to be covered by Disney,” (Guensburg 1998 
). Speculation about corporate interests dictating editorial decisions similarly came into 
play after an analysis of Time magazine’s lack of coverage of its owner’s purchase of 
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Warner Communications in the late 80s, a major media merger reported on by the New 
York Times and Newsweek. Later, Jason McManus, editor of Time Inc. said the decision 
may have been a poor one (Ciabattari 1989). “Every organization has its sacred cows,” a 
New York City-based Time reporter is quoted as saying in a 1989 Associated Press 
article on the basis of anonymity. “And there will be more of them here now […] It’s a 
sad development for us as journalists.” (Horn 1989).  
Media’s self-censorship of its own business practices continues today. When 
media conglomerate General Electric did not pay federal taxes after earning some $5.1 
billion dollars in 2010, all major media outlets, but one, swarmed around the story. NBC 
Nightly News– a GE holding– blatantly disregarded the topic in its broadcast for four 
nights straight. NBC subsequently denied the decision had anything to do with its 
corporate boss (Farhi 2011).  
Media “synergies” – joint ventures among media to market and advertise products 
– have been shown to accelerate the level of caution news outlets may exert when 
directing content. Studies indicate that when a media corporation owns multiple ventures 
it will exhibit favorability bias to benefit its parent company by way of cross promotion 
and synergistic marketing (Lee and Hwang 2004, McAllister, 2002).  
For example, in a recent study examining whether or not media conglomerates 
take advantage of their outlets to advocate their products, researchers discovered news 
network CNN, a subsidiary of Time Warner “showed favoritism” toward their parent 
company’s films. The network increased the amount of coverage of Time Warner’s 
movies post the merger and reduced the coverage of its competitors’ films (Jaemin 2011). 
In essence, the study reveals ownership change did influence content. The research builds 
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off findings analyzing Time magazine and Newsweek’s entertainment-based articles 
before and after the business merger between Time Inc. and Warner Communication. It 
similarly showed conglomerate ownership can cause bias toward entertainment media of 
its parent company (Lee and Hwang 1997).  
Media concentration has very serious and potentially dire consequences for 
democracy, media scholars argue (Newman 2005, Scott 2005, Baker 2007, Bagdikian 
2004, McChesney 2000). As the news and information citizens rely on to self-govern in a 
democracy becomes increasingly consolidated, the opportunities for diverse viewpoints, 
criticism of the status quo and a more authentic representation of society diminishes. The 
citizenry stands further away from understanding the world around them, and thus 
become removed from the pertinent knowledge needed to vote, mobilize and take action 
to progress democracy. And as the judicial system is shown to privilege the free speech 
rights of dominant media owners instead of the average citizens, the opportunities to 
exercise First Amendment rights in turn have the potential to shrink (Stein 2006).  
Lessig stresses the effect of media concentration on copyright law, arguing the 
power over control in the film, TV and music industries has augmented so drastically 
over the past few decades that room for independent creative work is being threatened 
like never before (Lessig 2004). Dominance over copyright has situated large media 
corporations in a very lucrative position and one that they fight hard to maintain. 
Considering this, it may be no wonder why media corporations felt compelled to ally 
with SOPA. As a piece of media policy legislation in line with the vested business 
interests of media conglomerates, coverage of the Stop Online Piracy Act should be 
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analyzed for favorability bias considering the history of potential economic influence in 
corporate news outlets.   
 
Theoretical Framework    
The media’s role in prioritizing what filters into our national discourse and debate 
cannot be understated. Through the use of framing and agenda-setting, major print outlets 
and TV news networks possess the power to bring an issue to prominence as well as 
marginalize it, communication research indicates (Iyengar, Kinder 1987). When the news 
media set the agenda– or in other words, define what is relevant and important to the 
American public– they can influence not only what people should think about, but what 
attitude they should adopt when thinking about certain topics (Iyengar 1991, McCombs 
and Shaw 1972). In the context of television news, the level of verbal and visual 
emphasis, the amount of airtime devoted to a news story and the number of updates given 
to an issue act as cues to signal its significance and ultimately aid in shaping public 
opinion about a subject.  
This lends the media system ample opportunity to negatively frame stories that 
run counter to their own interests or altogether dismiss them. Considering this power, the 
question of whether or not some news organizations exemplify partisan bias in their 
reporting is continually debated and rarely agreed upon as the standard for “objectivity” 
remains elusive, if not a wholly fictional benchmark to begin with (Bennett 2007). In 
fact, some scholars argue a more subtle, yet complex– and arguably more insidious– bias 
lies in the media, one that is not necessarily guided by left or right-wing politics but 
rather, profit-margin. In their seminal work examining the political economy of the 
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media, Noam Chomksy and Edward Herman argue the media generally seek to  
“marginalize dissent and allow the government and dominant private interests to get their 
message across to the public” in order to maintain multiple financial interests and 
hegemonic power structures through what they construct as, “the Propaganda Model,” 
(Chomsky, Herman 1988). Money and power, they argue, “filter out the news fit to 
print.” These built-in biases are meant to protect corporate power and weaken the 
public’s grasp of the forces that shape American society. This institutional favoritism 
may manifest in different forms– overt biases that frame and shape the narrative to favor 
these power structures or covert biases such as censorship by omission, a strategy in 
which news outlets completely avoid mentioning relevant issues as to not pose a conflict 
to their own interests.  
Media outlets may evade or skew reporting on a myriad of issues that clash with 
its bottom line and the examples are vast and far-reaching, but here the focus is in 
examining the media’s role in covering policy and politics that challenge its place as a 
lucrative and powerful industry. Unlike comparable corporate institutions, the media is 
ideally situated to shape public sentiment and understanding (or lack thereof) of the very 
industry it exists in. The U.S. political sphere has for the most part failed to critically 
question media ownership, structure and control of the media system, interestingly 
suggesting the media itself precipitated this lack of criticism by avoiding or minimizing 
media policy issues to perpetuate their financial dominance and sustain their stake in the 
industry (McChesney 2008). Any controversy or debate in regards to these issues are 
largely off-limits in the mainstream media and when the system’s legitimacy is, in fact, 
challenged, the media have historically shown to respond in the two aforementioned 
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ways– either by ignoring the topic/providing minimal coverage (described as, “standard 
operating procedure,” by McChesney) or by distorting coverage to service their own 
investments. The rising imbalance in media power rests in what is chosen– or what is not 
chosen– in print and broadcast, Bagdikian (2004) says.  
Some indicate this problem will intensify in the coming years as the media 
become increasingly consolidated and vertically integrated, stretching their ownership to 
encompass a diverse array of investments. Symptomatic of this concentrated ownership, 
incidents of overt censorship will diminish because the process of self-censorship will 
take over, suggests Bennett (2007). We will likely see less critical coverage of the media 
industry in general and parent companies in particular. When it comes to the subject of 
media consolidation, the media are “close to absolute in their self-censorship,” says 
Bagdikian (2004). Former NBC News president turned journalism professor, William 
Small admits to the systemic self-censorship, describing it as, “the single greatest 
concern” with the ever more powerful global media empires controlling news 
organizations (Bennett 2007).  
Censorship by omission may be relevant in analyzing coverage of SOPA since 
previous research demonstrates broadcasters have developed a pattern of blacking out 
communication policy news that would run counter to their interests. As agenda setters, a 
blackout plays to the media’s greatest strength, write Page and Snider (1997) in their 
examination of the media’s failure to report on major telecommunications legislation in the 
mid-90s. For example, if broadcasters covered the Telecommunications Act of 1996, they 
would have been forced to give their opponents a platform to challenge and doubt the 
legislation and thus provide unwanted pushback to their desires (Page and Snider 1997). 
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SOPA’s implications in threatening corporate media’s stake in profitable intellectual 
property as well as its large grassroots activist oppositional base, adequately equip it to 
experience systemic mainstream media marginalization or censorship by omission.  And 
unlike the Telecommunications Act of 1996, rather than extensive and behind-the-scenes 
lobbying efforts– media owners directly and publicly supported the legislation with a 
letter to Congress, granting reason to suspect a potential blackout of the topic.  
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Chapter 2: Blackout? : An examination of SOPA coverage by TV networks  
 
Methodology: 
As past research indicates, broadcasters have largely failed to cover or skewed the 
narrative in their favor when it comes to significant media policy issues that negatively 
affect them. As arguably one of the most important pieces of media legislation of 2011-
2012 and one that the broadcast industry has a vested interest in, coverage of SOPA 
appears ripe for examination. In lieu of the newspapers or other media owned by parent 
company supporters of SOPA, this study focuses on television news, specifically evening 
newscasts, for a host of reasons. For one, TV remains the most widely used source for 
national and international news, drawing 66 percent of Americans in as their number one 
outlet for public affairs (Pew Research 2011). Secondly, studies show the undeniable 
power of TV news, suggesting people actually learn more from television news than from 
other mediums, like radio and newspaper. Through the mixed use of oftentimes high-
production audio and visual imagery, television news compels viewers to stimulate the 
brain in a more holistic way, igniting emotional responses and creating a lasting affect 
unmatched by other media (Graber 1988). Finally, with an average of 22.5 million people 
tuning into ABC, CBS or NBC News each night in 2011 combined with the viewership of 
the first and second leading cable news networks–Fox and MSNBC–– it appears most 
Americans receive their daily news from one of these outlets and thus make the prime 
time news programs ideal for analysis (Pew Research 2012).  
This study explores two central questions to determine if broadcast outlets 
shielded news coverage of the topic or possibly reported on the issue with bias. To 
answer, “How much attention did major television news networks whose parent 
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companies supported SOPA devote to the bill during their nightly broadcasts? and “How 
much attention did major television news networks whose parent companies supported 
SOPA devote to the bill during their nightly broadcasts after the Internet Blackout 
protesting the Act?” a manifest content analysis of ABC, NBC, CBS, MSNBC and Fox 
News nightly news broadcasts between Oct. 26- Jan. 17, 2011 was conducted. The dates 
range from the bill’s introduction to the day of the highly publicized Internet “Blackout.” 
The quantitative data is derived from a Lexis-Nexis database search. Basic syntactical 
units of speech and any mention of “The Stop Online Piracy Act/SOPA and Protect IP 
Act/PIPA,” during nightly newscasts were coded.  
 
The following represents the sample set analyzed:  
ABC World News 5:30 p.m. -6 p.m.  
CBS Evening News 5:30 p.m. -6 p.m. 
NBC Nightly News 5:30 p.m. -6 p.m. 
Fox News Special Report with Bret Baier 5 p.m-6 p.m. 
MSNBC PoliticsNation 5 p.m.- 6-p.m.  
  
Potential validity issues include the inherent subjectivity and biases of the coder, 
the time frame of the programs analyzed and the possibility some rhetorical features may 
be missed by human or computer error. Research limitations include a limited sample set. 
If further research is desired, one may modify the research design to examine daytime or 
late-night news broadcasts, newsmagazine programs, coverage on the news 
organization’s Web sites or expand the scope of evening broadcasts to include cable 
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network CNN (TimeWarner is a listed supporter) and juxtapose coverage with that of 
public broadcasting stations. An additional supplemental suggestion is to entirely shift 
focus to an examination of major mainstream print publications of those parent 
companies in support of SOPA (i.e. The Wall Street Journal/NewsCorp).  
 
Expected Results:  
 
Considering the conclusions unearthed by previous studies examining the media’s  
role in reporting on topics adverse to their industry, I expect to find those mainstream 
news networks whose parent companies have vowed support to SOPA slow to cover– or 
perhaps altogether absent from– reporting on the Act. While I surmise a correlative 
relationship, a direct causal one cannot be established without declarations of corporate 
influence from the network news agenda-setters themselves.  
Other variables that could account for lack of coverage may include timing, 
prioritized coverage and editorial decisions that did not take into account parent company 
business interests. However, the data produced may aid in the argument among scholars, 
media advocacy groups and journalists that because of its own political and economic 
interests in promoting the copyright legislation, news networks failed to draw significant 
attention to a timely, relevant and noteworthy issue that otherwise would be considered a 
priority.  
This study hopes to further advance the scope of work related to political 
economy of the mainstream media and future examination’s into media conflict of 
interest reporting. It also aims to contribute to the push by academics and public interest 
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groups to ensure viewers and readers of information seek out alternative and non-
corporate sources of news.  
 
Results:  
 
TABLE 1 Pre-Internet “Blackout”    
 
   Number of mentions of “Stop Online Piracy Act/SOPA or Protect IP Act/PIPA”  
 
 
ABC    0 
 
CBS    0  
 
NBC    0 
 
Fox News   0 
 
MSNBC    0 
 
Data retrieved from Lexis-Nexis Database, October 26, 2011- January 17, 2012 
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TABLE 2   - Post Internet “Blackout” 
 
   Number of mentions of “Stop Online Piracy Act/SOPA or Protect IP Act/PIPA”  
 
 
ABC   0   
 
CBS   0   
 
NBC   1  
 
Fox News  1  
 
MSNBC   0  
 
Data retrieved from Lexis-Nexis Database, January 18, 2012- February 1, 2012 
 
All evening news programs analyzed failed to report on the Stop Online Piracy 
Act from the day of the legislation’s inception to the day before the highly publicized 
“Internet Blackout.” Each one of these nightly programs either publicly advocated SOPA 
or were owned by a parent company that signaled its support for the Act.  
ABC, a publicly listed supporter of SOPA and owned by the parent company of 
another public supporter, Disney Publishing Worldwide, completely disregarded the topic 
in the given time frame across all its broadcast outlets. Ignoring the topic during its 
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nightly newscasts, CBS brought the legislation up briefly during its January 17, 2012 
Morning News show, focusing solely on Wikipedia’s planned protest of the Act. The 
transcript reads:  
 
Well, the online encyclopedia Wikipedia plans to protest--in fact one of its own--
blacking out its English language version tomorrow. Wikipedia is protesting the Stop 
Online Piracy Act under consideration in Congress. Wikipedia says the proposed law 
would harm the free internet and bring about new tools of censorship to the U.S. 
 
 
Historical, technical and policy-based context, interviews with stakeholders, 
politicians and the public were absent from the reporting. Instead, the news clip reads as a 
short, one-source informational centered on the actions of a single site. Viewers gain no 
greater knowledge of how SOPA would inhibit the Internet or censor free speech.  
It is expected these newscasts would begin to draw more attention to the Act after 
the widespread Web censorship day. For example, prompted by the coordinated Internet 
blackout that occurred that very day (January 18), NBC Nightly News with Brian 
Williams devoted a single segment to the issue on their evening news program. In his 
report, journalist Kevin Tibbles did openly disclose NBCUniversal’s support for the 
legislation. “Those in the media industry supporting regulation, including NBC 
Universal, claim online piracy costs some $135 billion a year and steals 2.5 million jobs 
worldwide.” Conversely, during Fox News’ evening broadcast featuring the topic on the 
day of the blackout, reporter Claudia Cowen points to “Hollywood movie and recording 
studios” as examples of those in the industry that are in favor of the legislation, but omits 
mention of parent company, NewsCorp.’s stated support of the Act. While the general 
public pits conservative-leaning Fox News against liberal MSNBC, the media policy 
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issue seems to cut across partisan lines in the political spectrum as well as the media 
industry. Rachel Maddow, a progressive champion, mentioned SOPA during the end of 
her 8 p.m. program “The Rachel Maddow Show” on January 18, but did not disclose the 
fact the network’s parent company advocated Congress to pass the Act. On her January 
20th show, Maddow humbly admitted she had undercovered the topic and perhaps gives 
viewers a window into the network’s editorial decision-making process surrounding 
SOPA, stating:  
 
We’ve absolutely under-covered it on this show, which is something that I regret. 
But it’s in part because this is tough to talk about in terms of explaining it in a 
way that makes it useful for your viewers. That should be seen as a challenge and 
not an excuse, but sometimes that is a reason not to cover it, especially when 
there’s lots of other things going on. 
 
 
 
The findings indicate possible self-censorship by media conglomerate’s new 
networks. As a major piece of legislation with widespread implications, the news 
networks– either intentionally or unintentionally– chose to ignore the topic from the 
Act’s introduction to the highly publicized “Blackout Day.” In the context of mainstream 
marginalization due to economic interests, these results tend to fall in line within the 
framework of political economy studies – because all news network’s parent companies 
publicly supported the Act and stood to financially gain from its passage, they opted to 
either dismiss or minimize coverage of the controversy. It is difficult to concretely pose a 
causal relationship and many factors could have contributed to the lack of attention, but 
the results themselves, at the least, contribute to highlighting the mainstream media’s 
scarcity of media policy reporting. 
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While the debate remained absent from nightly news, not everyone in the media 
stayed silent. Pointing to the link between parent company interests and the lack of 
coverage, a study by media watchdog organization Media Matters for America found that 
with the exception of a single segment on CNN, most TV news networks ignored the 
topic (Dimiero 2012). The report interestingly noted that while primetime reporting was 
scarce, online outlets of many of the news organizations analyzed did post “regular 
articles” about the legislation. Calling it “the most important bill in Congress you may 
have never heard of,” MSNBC critical commentator Chris Hayes comprehensively 
spotlighted the legislation during his January 15 program. Hayes stated the, “most 
remarkable” aspect of the legislation was that, “most Americans have no idea it’s going 
on.” In his reporting, Hayes fully disclosed NBC-Universal, his network parent 
company’s stake in the issue, saying they are, “not at all neutral” in the battle for SOPA 
and even opted to interview the NBC-Universal executive vice president on air, going 
toe-to-toe with his own boss over the controversial bill. Hayes’ transparency breaks from 
the convention of conflict of interest journalism, providing a rare example of what many 
critics charge the media should do if they, in fact, possess a stake in the story.  
Despite the paucity of information over the evening airwaves, SOPA still 
managed to receive considerable attention and pushback. What could have been side 
lined as an esoteric policy issue relegated to the technology community became the basis 
of a sizable grassroots movement that included a wide swath of citizens from all sides of 
the aisle. Said to be the largest online protest in history, dissent to both SOPA and PIPA 
ignited 10 million petition signatures, 8 million calls, 4 million e-mails and the 
participation of more than 115,000 Web sites, according to non-profit activist group Fight 
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for the Future. Considering the boisterous upswell of opposition, it is worthy to ask how, 
then, did the public learn about SOPA? 
Rumblings of an anti-SOPA faction began in less mainstream arenas of the online 
world, like Reddit and Tumblr as well as e-mail chains and Internet message boards. 
Those with the most in jeopardy were coincidently the most adept at creating one of the 
strongest venues of protest in 21st century America–viral campaigning (Wortham, 2012). 
On some level, technologists used the Internet to save the Internet. A mixture of non-
mainstream news, the work of public interest advocacy organizations like The Electronic 
Frontier Foundation, Public Knowledge and Free Press as well as marketing campaigns 
touting punchy slogans like "Don't Break the Internet," via social media continued to 
elevate the legislation to prominence (Tsukayama, Kang 2011; Wortham 2012). For 
instance, Twitter users mentioned #SOPA 2.2 million times and #STOPSOPA nearly 
200,000 times (Fight for the Future 2012). And the millions left unaware of the 
controversial anti-piracy Act were forced to learn about its significance when high-traffic 
sites (some of which are traditionally non-activist) like Google, WordPress and 
Wikipedia directed users to homepages either explaining their opposition to the bill, how 
visitors could take action to stop it or censored their sites altogether in protest.  
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Conclusion  
The Internet’s ability to offset the lack of news available in the mainstream could 
be a signal of the new direction to come. While TV news remains the leader in informing 
the American public, the tide may slowly be shifting. A 2011 Pew Research Center study 
found the Internet is gradually catching up to television as Americans' main source of 
national and international news, with 41 percent of respondents indicating they receive 
most of their national and international news online. Placing all hope in the Internet as a 
democratizing force is cautioned against by some scholars who suggest that even though 
the Web does make strides in citizen mobilization and fundraising efforts, Web traffic is 
still funneled through and dominated by a handful of elite corporate owners (Hindman 
2008). Despite the thousands of blogs seeking to democratize the concentrated landscape, 
the majority of those sites are not seen by most Americans, as the top 20 news sites are 
owned by major media corporations (Copps 120). It has also been suggested the majority 
of users log on only to reinforce existing points of view, thus creating an “echo chamber” 
effect (Sunstein 2009). Additionally, it is important to note the barriers to access due to 
the digital divide– most strikingly along class and race lines– exacerbates the problematic 
“Internet solution” theory as an equalizing force. While the divide appears to be 
narrowing, the disparity continues to persist (Rojas, Straubaar et al. 2004). 
Nevertheless, some indicate the digital age still possesses unprecedented potential 
to challenge familiar patterns of media, such as gate-keeping, agenda setting and 
corporate bias as access to new and alternative sources of news are made easily available 
(Bennett 2007). Maxwell McCombs, the pioneer of agenda-setting himself, writes the 
media are only able to set the agenda when citizens believe the news stories reported are 
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relevant and important. In other words, the public can reject a topic they see as irrelevant, 
diluting the influential agenda-setting effect and granting agency to the citizen. As 
definite answers remain to be seen, the SOPA case study may lend some hope to the 
prospect that online news sources and social media can aid in the inversion of the 
mainstream tradition of silencing voices when it comes to media policy reporting.  
The notion of a functioning and viable democratic society is predicated on an 
informed and active electorate. Without a citizenry attuned to relevant public affairs 
necessary to make decisions, participate in the electoral process and petition their 
government for a more just political, economic and social system, the institution fails. As 
a hugely influential channel between news and the public, the media thus play an integral 
part in connecting people to the issues. If the media become corrupted by monied and 
corporate interests the relationship falls in jeopardy and democracy is thus threatened.  
This fragile dynamic is why many media scholars choose to focus their studies on 
the fourth estate and its role in a democracy and why many of them warn against the 
threat of a consolidated media landscape and move to support one unencumbered by 
corporate conflict of interest and aimed at serving the public interest, not the profit-
margin. While SOPA coverage is but a microcosm of the possibility of censorship of 
relevant information by a corporatized media, instances similar to the SOPA blackout 
will undoubtedly return and persist as concentration increases.  
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